Fortres 101 v4.1

Fortres 101 v4.1 is a now obsolete desktop security and system lockdown utility developed by Fortres Grand Corporation. Released around 2000, it was a staple in schools, public libraries & kiosks during the Windows 9x (95/98/ME) era.

Unlike modern “reboot-to-restore” software (like Deep Freeze), Fortres 101 focuses on real-time restriction, preventing users from making changes to the system in the first place.

Core Functionality & Purpose

Version 4.1 was designed to make a Windows PC “indestructible” by restricting user access to the operating system’s core. Its primary goals were:

Desktop Lockdown: Preventing users from moving, deleting, or renaming icons.
File Protection: Blocking access to specific files, folders, or entire drives (like the C: drive).
System Preservation: Preventing users from reaching the Control Panel, Registry Editor, or Command Prompt.
Software Control: Blocking the installation of new software or the execution of unauthorized .exe files.

Key Features of Version 4.1

Invisible Operation: Once configured, the software ran silently in the background with no visible windows or icons to tip off the user.
Administrator Overrides: A specific “Hot Key” combination (usually a sequence like Ctrl + Alt + Shift + F or similar) would trigger a password prompt to allow an admin to disable the security temporarily.
Boot Protection: It prevented users from interrupting the boot process to bypass security via Safe Mode.
Single-Password System: It didn’t rely on Windows User Accounts (which were weak in Win9x); instead, it used its own internal password database.

Technical Specifications (Historical)

Developer: Fortres Grand Corporation (based in Plymouth, Indiana).
Release Year: 2000.
Format: Distributed primarily on CD-ROM and floppy disks.
Compatibility: Optimized for Windows 95, Windows 98, and Windows NT 4.0.
File Size: The installer was incredibly small by modern standards, typically around 8MB to 10MB.

Historical Vulnerabilities

In the early 2000s, Fortres 101 was a frequent target for “kiosk hacking.” Common bypasses for version 4.1 often involved:

Exploiting the “Open/Save” dialog boxes in authorized programs (like WordPad) to navigate the file system.
Using specific keyboard shortcuts that weren’t properly suppressed in early versions.
Booting from a floppy disk or “Linux Live CD” (if the BIOS wasn’t also locked) to delete the Fortres system files.

In previous v3 releases, the program didn’t protect the C:\FGC installation folder allowing it to be renamed to FGC1. Thus allowing a user like myself at 13yo for instance to reboot the system unprotected, rename it back to FGC once the user or myself was finished using the computer, so the School Librarian in my case or the School Network Administrator to never know it was even disabled.

Preservation

This is end of life software, do not run this in a production environment.

With help from a childhood friend, we were able to search around, recover & preserve some keys specific to this v4.1 version - previously this program was only able to be installed in DEMO mode. As described by i80386sx in his demo of Fortres 101 on Youtube.

14138-4492999-583
14128-4404299-684
14140-9182099-939
14115-2319599-560
14125-9605099-803
14101-5623699-990

18765-2310623-567
This key does not work, as the licencing master key between 4.0 & 4.1 was changed.

The license key is a multi-part sequence designed to interact with a machine-specific identifier, requiring a precise mathematical match against hidden registry values that are unique to each individual installation.

Examination of the Licencing Archictecture

An analysis of the fgcreg2.dll binary reveals that the licensing system implemented within Fortres 101 version 4.1 constitutes a sophisticated, multi-layered validation framework. This architecture deviates significantly from conventional static serial verification by employing a dynamic, environment-dependent methodology. Consequently, the development of a universal key generation utility is precluded by several technical factors.

Hardware-Dependent Identity Binding (The ObjectID)

The initial five-character segment of the licensure key, hereafter referred to as the ObjectID, is derived through a deterministic relationship with the host environment’s unique hardware profile.

The software executes queries against the system registry—specifically within the HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT\CLSID\ hive—to extract unique Universal Unique Identifiers (UUIDs) and session-specific strings via the UuidToStringA API. Because this ObjectID is generated locally and is unique to the workstation’s configuration, an external key generation utility lacks the necessary entropy to predict the required prefix. Any discrepancy between the submitted key and the internally generated ID results in an immediate termination of the validation sequence.

Dynamic Correlation of Registry State

Further validation is contingent upon a mathematical correspondence between the tripartite license key and an obfuscated registry value designated as Info.

Formal Relationship: The verification algorithm mandates that the difference between the primary numerical component (Part B) and the sum of the ObjectID (Part A) and the terminal suffix (Part C) must result in the precise integer stored within the system’s registry:

PartB - PartA - PartC = Info

Variable Target Parameters: The value assigned to the Info variable is non-static and appears to be established during the initial software deployment. Since this value remains unknown to the generator, the mathematical target for any valid key remains undefined for any machine other than the one currently being interrogated.

Obfuscated Internal Integrity Checksums

Beyond external registry dependencies, the software subjects individual digits to modular arithmetic and non-linear transformations within the sub_10002917 function. These checks are designed to mitigate the efficacy of heuristic pattern-matching.

Complexity of Validation: While superficial patterns may appear to exist (e.g., modular summation of early indices), empirical evidence suggests these are either decoys or components of a higher-order logic branch. The presence of conditional branch logic that varies based on the underlying ObjectID suggests a “trapdoor” function, where valid inputs are computationally difficult to synthesize without access to the original proprietary algorithm.

Integrated System Monitoring and Anti-Analysis Protocols

The software incorporates defensive measures designed to detect and neutralize attempts at binary analysis or memory manipulation.

Memory Integrity Verification: Through the invocation of VirtualQuery, the module monitors its own AllocationBase to ensure the integrity of its instructions in memory.

Anti-Debugging Safeguards: The system is engineered to identify the presence of kernel-mode or user-mode debuggers. Upon detection of such investigative tools, the software is programmed to return a nullified validation state or to trigger a systemic failure within the Windows 9x Virtual Machine Manager (VMM), thereby protecting the licensing logic from observation.

Conclusion

The synthesis of a universal key generation utility is deemed mathematically and practically unfeasible. Such an endeavor is hindered by the absence of the proprietary server-side activation algorithms and the intricate binding of the validation state to host-specific registry values. It is posited that circumventing the security apparatus would require a direct modification of the binary execution path rather than the generation of valid cryptographic credentials.

The cryptographic nature of the Fortres 101 v4.1 licensing system can be summarized as a host-bound asymmetric verification loop.

Unlike standard software that checks if a key is “valid” in isolation, this system tethers the key to a unique Hardware Fingerprint (the ObjectID) and a pre-calculated Registry Token (the Info value). Because the software requires a mathematical equilibrium between the key you provide and the secret data already hidden on your specific hard drive, a universal keygen is impossible.

One-Way Activation: The “Info” value in your registry was originally generated by a proprietary Fortres Grand server-side algorithm. Without that specific algorithm, you cannot calculate the required “target” for the equation Part B − Part A − Part C.
Context-Specific Math: The internal checksums are “trapdoor” functions that change their behavior based on your ObjectID. Without the source code or the master “key-space” map from the developers, there is no way to predict which digit-relationships are required for a specific machine.
Active Defense: The system uses kernel-mode (Ring 0) protection to hide its own logic from the very tools used to study it, effectively “blinding” researchers trying to map out the verification path.

Cameron's Notes